Foreword

This unpublished manuscript was written in 1987 as part of a debate with the Revolutionary Socialist League which had been carried on over a period of years. The article here is an expanded and extensively revised version of an article that appeared in ideas & action #7 (Fall, 1986). The article was in reply to a letter by Wayne Price, which was printed in that same issue.

The initial exchange took place at a forum in New York City in May of 1984. Mike Harris spoke for the Libertarian Workers Group and Wayne Price spoke for the Revolutionary Socialist League. (The Workers Solidarity Alliance, a national anarcho-syndicalist organization, was formed later that year, in November, and the LWG became the New York Area Group of the WSA.) That dialogue was reprinted in the September 20th and November 15th, 1984, issues of Torch/La Antorcha, and in issue #5 (Winter/Spring, 1985) of ideas & action. The second exchange -- on the subject of "national liberation" -- was prompted by a Torch/ La Antorcha cover story headlined "Defend Libya!" That debate appeared in the April 15th and November 15th, 1986, issues of Torch/La Antorcha.

The Great Depression of the '30s only deepened a social crisis that had been brewing in Spanish society for decades.

Spain's growers couldn't find markets for their citrus fruits, olives and other commodities. Lands were left unused. With no livelihood, farm laborers were destitute. The Republican politicians talked of "land reform" but did little.

The farm workers began to seize land -- thousands and thousands of acres of land. And they began farming the land themselves. This movement was organized in the farmworker unions, such as the Land Workers Federation of the UGT (General Union of Workers), which swelled to 500,000 members. This dynamic farm labor movement, which now made up 40% of the UGT, was moving in a more radical direction than had characterized the social-democratic UGT.(1)

Meanwhile, revolutionary unionism had also grown as a force among industrial workers as well. Catalonia -- the Catalan-speaking region around Barcelona -- had been a center of trade in the Mediterranean basin for several centuries and had developed a fairly dense growth of manufacturing and commercial enterprises, contributing 70% of Spain's industrial capacity.* It was the industrial workforce in this region that provided the main stronghold of Spain's libertarian union movement -- the Confederacion Nacional de Trabajo (National Confederation of Labor -- CNT), which was the driving force behind the revolution in Spain in the '30s. Nation-wide membership in the CNT grew from 500,000 in 1931 to 1.7 million as of May, 1936.

In the months immediately following the election of the liberal Popular Front government in February of 1936, no less than 34 towns and cities in Spain were shaken by general strikes.

The growers and industrialists had zero confidence in the ability of the liberal politicians to deal "effectively" with the revolutionary labor movement. The business class was about to play its last card: naked military violence. When the troops moved out of their barracks in the early morning hours of July 19th, 1936, the fascist solution was set in play.

The response of the working class was more intense than the fascist military officers had expected. The unions armed their members and fought back. In Barcelona the army was beaten and the CNT workers defense committee was in control. The sailors in the Spanish Navy mutinied and shot or arrested their fascist officers. The workers on the railroads took over and told the management they were no longer needed.

But, as Ronald Fraser points out:

"Power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. Even more so in the crucible of a civil war which is the politics of class struggle raised to the extreme of armed conflict. The means of production [in Catalonia] were largely in the hands of the Catalan working class, but political power was atomized in myriad committees...Such dual (if not multiple) power, normal to an incomplete revolution, could not remain static."(2)

Taking over individual workplaces and setting up local committees could only go so far in advancing workers power in society. To consolidate the revolution and unify the fight against Franco, the working class needed a program for uniting the rank-and-file of the various unions independent of the capitalist State.

What was the CNT's program?

In the previous issue of ideas & action [#6], I began my description of the CNT's program with these words:

"The CNT held that workers unity in the revolutionary situation had to be built by the workers themselves independently of the State. Rejecting the "Popular Front" as a top-down unity of leaders over the working class, the CNT's slogan was, "Unity, yes, but by the rank-and-file." The CNT...called for...a Defense Council and Economics Council at both the national and regional levels. These would be...elected by the labor organizations."

[In his letter in issue #6, Wayne] Price [of the Revolutionary Socialist League] then jumps to the following conclusion:

"It soon becomes clear that the CNT program T.W. is describing is not at all a program of democratic workers' councils, elected by workers at the factory floor...The existing union leaderships, as they were, would get together and appoint committees, dividing up the posts in proportion to their unions' strengths."

Price is of course correct to zero in on the relationship between the Councils and the rank-and-file. But, to begin with, Price ignores the next paragraph in my description of the CNT's program:

"The councils were not intended to be executive authorities that could do anything they wanted to, but would be coordinating bodies restricted to implementing mandates worked out at grassroots labor congresses. The congresses would work out a program for workers management of the economy and defense of the revolution based on ideas brought to the congress from local worker assemblies. This system of worker congresses, and mandated councils to coordinate defense and the economy, was intended to replace the existing government and be the basis of proletarian power."

An influential formulation of this program of councils and congresses is to be found in the book El Organismo Economico de la Revolucion,(3) by Abad Diego de Santillan. Discussing the role of the national economic council, de Santillan says

"It receives its directives from below, it makes adjustments according to regional and national congresses." Just as the CNT Congresses were the supreme policy-making body in the CNT itself, they envisioned a similar body emanating from the rank-and-file assemblies to make the guiding decisions for a socialized economy.

Between the meetings of the congresses there would obviously need to be some ongoing coordinating body. Hence the Councils. But the anarcho-syndicalist program called for council delegates to be elected by the rank-and-file and rotated out of office after a limited term. The libertarian militants would have been opposed to the councils making important decisions or changing policy without a mandate from the rank-and-file.

Joan Ferrer, a bookkeeper who was the secretary of the CNT commercial workers union in Barcelona, described the Economics Council this way:

"It was our idea in the CNT that everything should start from the worker, not -- as with the Communists -- that everything should be run by the state. To this end we wanted to set up industrial federations -- textiles, metal-working, department stores, etc. -- which would be represented on an overall Economics Council which would direct the economy. Everything, including economic planning, would thus remain in the hands of the workers." (4)

Anti-Bureaucratic Measures

In addition to measures like rotation from office, there are two important limitations on the power of the Councils that would have made it difficult for them to become a "bureaucratic dictatorship."

First, they would not have a top-down management power over any economic activity. The various industries would be run by self-governing "industrial federations." If we remember that industry was to be socially-owned and economic planning carried out through the regional and national congresses, this means the workers in each industry do not "own" that industry but run it as a kind of "subcontract" on behalf of all workers.

Second, the Councils would not have any top-down, professional armed bodies at their disposal. There would be no anarchist Cheka,(5) for example.

The only armed force for the defense of the revolutionary order would be the militia bodies organized by the unions. The militia would be unified and the National Defense Council would provide the coordination. In times of peace the militia members would be living and working among the rest of the populace, and, thus, they would tend to have the same outlook and interests as their fellow workers.

The militia bodies that were actually formed by the CNT in the revolution were internally self-governing, not hierarchical. Each militia column was administered by its own "war committee," made up of elected delegates. Yet, these columns were not an independent power, like a guerrilla army, but were responsible to the union organization that had organized them, through the CNT's Confederal Defense Committee. This was essential if the working class is to control the revolutionary armed force.

Unity, yes, but how?

Faced with a fight to the death, a strategy for achieving unity of the working class was essential. For the working class to unify to fight Franco and consolidate their power in the Spanish revolution, it was necessary to build organizations to bring together workers from the various unions. The CNT could not ignore the 1.4 million workers in the UGT unions. That's why the CNT had called for a "revolutionary alliance" with the UGT at its Saragossa Congress in May of 1936. The UGT also had revolutionary impulses, as indicated by role of the UGT miners' union in the revolution in Asturias in 1934. The UGT union movement cannot be simply dismissed as "reformist," as Price tends to do. The UGT Land Workers Federation, in particular, was, in effect, a mass revolutionary movement.

Land seizures and farm collectivization characterized the Spanish revolution in the countryside not only because of the libertarian political influences in the country but because it was a practical solution to the poverty and unemployment afflicting Spain's agricultural laborers. Thus, it should not surprise us that the practices and programs of the UGT and CNT farm worker unions were quite similar.

The Socialist and Communist parties were calling for the populace to rally behind the liberal "Popular Front" government. If the CNT had no program for achieving unity, they would have no alternative to the Popular Front. But the CNT did have a strategy for achieving working class unity. The CNT's program of Councils of Defense to coordinate the militias and Congresses to make plans for the economy and the war effort provided the necessary means for achieving unity independent of the Republican state. To the extent that other unions had support within the working class, their voices would be heard in the assemblies of the Industrial Federations, Congresses and Councils.

The FAI Myth

Price, however, says that "this program would have been a version of the revolutionary party-state dictatorship, made up of a bloc of parties, not just one." He says this because he apparently believes that all the unions in Spain at the time were mere appendages of political parties, and he sees the relationship of the CNT to the FAI (Iberian Anarchist Federation) as identical to that of the relationship between the UGT and the Socialist Party. Mass democratic movements thus disappear; only the "leadership" is significant.

Price ignores the differences in how the UGT and CNT were run, and the differences in the relations to political organizations. For one thing, the UGT had a permanent bureaucracy at the top; Largo Caballero was the top paid official of the UGT for years. The UGT had a top-down structure which permitted much control by top officials, who were often political party leaders.

In the CNT, on the other hand, the sindicato unicos (local industry-wide unions) at the base of the federation were self-governing, and there was not a permanently constituted bureaucracy at the top. The National Secretary of the CNT -- one of the few paid officials in the federation -- was rotated out of office every year. And the national and regional committees could not set policy, only congresses and conferences of union delegates could set the direction for the organization.

Price describes the FAI as "the leadership" of the CNT and he takes for granted the nature of this relationship. But maybe we should look more closely at it. To begin with, the FAI was a loose network of anarchist caucuses within the CNT unions, it was not a centralized or monolithic organization. Moreover, as Juan Gomez Casas points out in his history of the FAI, FAI militants frequently had a prior loyalty to the CNT. The FAI could not have had the sort of dominance over the CNT that is often attributed to it, Gomez Casas argues.

At union congresses, where policies and program for the movement were argued out,

"delegates, whether or not they were members of the FAI, were presenting resolutions adopted by their unions at open membership meetings. Actions taken at the congress had to be reported back to their unions at open meetings, and given the degree of union education among the members, it was impossible for delegates to support personal, nonrepresentative positions."(6)

The union committees were typically rotated out of office frequently and committeemen continued to work as wage-earners. In a movement so closely based on the shopfloor, the FAI could not maintain influence for long if they ignored the concerns and opinions of co-workers.

Gomez Casas argues that there were essentially three different anarcho-syndicalist tendencies within the CNT in the '30s: the FAI, the Treintistas and independent anarchists such as the Revista Blanca publishing group and the Los Solidarios group.(7) Only a minority of the anarcho-syndicalist activists in the CNT belonged to the FAI.

The Treintistas were so-called after a group of thirty influential CNT activists who published a manifesto in 1931 criticizing the CNT radical wing, accusing the FAI of exercizing a "dictatorship" over the CNT. For their part, the FAI accused the treintista leaders of abusing their official positions in the CNT and not allowing other viewpoints access to the union publications.

The conflict between the treintistas and the CNT radical wing finally led to a split in 1932. Angel Pestana, the treintista national secretary, was forced to resign, and Juan Peiro, a treintista glassworker who was head of the big daily paper Solidaridad Obrera, was also kicked out of office. The treintista sympathizers then set up their own union organization, the Federacion Obrera Libertaria (FOL -- Libertarian Workers Federation), which took out about 35,000 members from the CNT.(8)

The series of violent, insurrectionary attempts led by the CNT radical wing in the early '30s were exactly what the treintistas wanted to avoid. "In the January [1933] uprising," writes Jerome Mintz(9), "the treintistas...saw their worst fears realized: the national confederation and the regionals had been manipulated by a small group of militants who had committed the entire membership to precipitous and dangerous action. The membership had been badly mauled in street fighting, the leaders arrested and beaten, and the [unions] closed." The infamous massacre in the Andalucian village of Casas Viejas was part of the state's repression of this failed insurrection.

Mintz argues that the local defense committees of the CNT, though nominally responsible to the rank-and-file of the unions, were in fact stacked with FAIstas and other radical anarchists, who used their control of the defense committees to manipulate the CNT into violent insurrectionary adventures. He points to the report by Alexander Shapiro, a Russian anarchist who was visiting Spain for the International Workers Association (to which the CNT was affiliated). Shapiro criticizes the FAI activists for vanguardism and disregarding the interests of the CNT as a whole. In a letter to the CNT national committee, Shapiro "urged the CNT to make clear that it alone had the duty and right to organize the revolution and to choose the most propitious moment to initiate it. A coup by a very small group would inevitably lead to a concentration of power."(10)

Buenaventura Durruti, however, defended the CNT radical wing:

"We never thought that the revolution would be a seizure of power by a minority that would impose its will on the people... We want a revolution made by and for the people... Otherwise, it would be only a seizure of the state... We who come from the factory, the mine, and the farm, want a revolution that changes society. We want nothing to do with Blanquism (11) or Trotskyism." (12)

The distinction between the FAI and the CNT was sometimes seen as a division of responsibilities, as the FAI occasionally took on activities outside the CNT. Such as the publication of Soldado del Pueblo ("Soldier of the People"), directed at rank-and-file members of the military

By 1935 it was clear that the treintistas and the CNT radical wing were moving towards some sort of reconciliation, and the FOL was re-admitted to the CNT at the Saragossa Congress of May, 1936. Both the CNT radical wing and their treintista critics advocated the libertarian ideal of a movement democratically self-managed by the rank-and-file. Though the efforts to realize this ideal in the real world were not without conflicts and problems, I believe the CNT did come close to approximating this libertarian ideal in practice. Price's picture of the CNT as a mere "transmission belt" of the FAI ignores the CNT's character as a multi-tendencied, non-hierarchical, democratic mass movement. It was not the FAI but the CNT that was "the anarcho-syndicalist organization ...[that] led about half the Spanish workers and a large part of the peasants" in the revolution.

The CNT accepts collaboration

I've argued that the CNT's program of Councils of Defense to coordinate the labor militia and workers congresses to make plans for the economy and war effort provided the necessary means for building working class unity independent of the Republican State. The potential for building an alternative workers power to replace the government was particularly good in Catalonia where most of the workers belonged to the CNT. In July of '36 the CNT defense organization had de facto armed control. This bolstered the confidence of rank-and-file militants, and thus workers were taking over industry after industry.

In July of '36, as armed workers were defeating the Spanish army in the streets of Barcelona, Luis Companys, a liberal lawyer who was president of the Generalitat (regional government of Catalonia), sent a message to the CNT, proposing that they join a "Central Committee of Anti-Fascist Militias," sponsored by his government. This offer was made on July 20th, just as the CNT local federation of Barcelona was holding a plenary assembly of local unions to decide what to do. This meeting, and the regional conference of CNT unions of Catalonia, held the following day, effectively decided the CNT's course in the revolution, in my opinion.

Buenaventura Durruti, a machinist and a member of the radical Nosotros group, proposed that the CNT overthrow the government of Companys and organize a Regional Defense Council, which would be made up solely of delegates elected by members of the various unions. Juan Garcia Oliver -- another Nosotros member -- argued that a revolutionary situation was "all or nothing," and that they ought to move immediately towards carrying out their libertarian communist program.(13)

This proposal was opposed by others, who advised caution. Abad Diego de Santillan -- a physician who had previously written a book advocating the workers Council system,(14) now proposed that the CNT accept Companys' offer, but merely as a temporary expedient. He talked about the gold stocks in Madrid (fourth largest gold reserves in the world) and how the Popular Front government might be persuaded to provide aid to the CNT militias if they were operating under the auspices of the "legitimate" government.

The Republican government in Madrid, however, was perfectly aware that the goal of the CNT was a workers revolution that would sweep away the privileges and power of the Spanish business class. The government leaders feared the working class at least as much as they feared the fascist army. They would never give gold or arms to the CNT.

The union activists in Catalonia were apparently weighed down by a sense of isolation. If they overthrew the government and moved to put their revolutionary program into effect, "there was a serious risk they would not be followed by the rest of Spain," some delegates thought. Though the CNT was predominant in the industrial northeast, it was a minority in Madrid and central Spain. Saragossa (a major CNT stronghold) was in the hands of the army. The outcome in the south, in Andalucia, was in doubt. The large libertarian union movements in other countries, such as the FORA in Argentina, had already been suppressed by military or fascist regimes. The weakness of anarchism outside Spain meant that little help could be counted on from that source. Such were the considerations that apparently weakened the resolve of the Catalan militants.

The majority at the July 20-21 conferences went along with de Santillan's proposal, though only on condition that the CNT be given the majority on the Anti-Fascist Militia Committee. A sizeable minority of delegates were apparently disgusted by this decision. The delegation from Bajo Llobregat County (an industrial area south of Barcelona) walked out saying they'd never go along with government collaboration.

Once the CNT had decided not to build a grassroots workers power to unite the working class independently of the State, the pressures for some form of unity made collaboration with the Popular Front virtually unavoidable. If the CNT was not able to overthrow the government and carry out its program of building a unified workers power in Catalonia, where the CNT was strongest, how could CNTers in other areas have confidence in the CNT program? "From the moment the Catalan anarchists accepted collaboration with the Popular Front forces in Barcelona," Ronald Fraser writes, "Lorenzo Inigo [Libertarian Youth representative on the Madrid Defense Junta] had not believed it would be possible to make the libertarian revolution..."(15)

"Isolation" may explain the Catalan militants' fears but it doesn't justify their decision. If the CNT of Catalonia had given Companys the boot and set up a workers power in Catalonia, uniting the rank-and-file of the other unions with the CNT, this would have strengthened the resolve of workers in other parts of Spain, and it might have also inspired workers in nearby countries to move in a similar direction.

The CNT could have persuaded many UGT workers to join with them in building a united workers power to replace the bosses' state. The Regional Workers Council of Asturias and the Popular Committee of Valencia were both set up as joint UGT/CNT regional powers.

Meanwhile, the Socialist and Communist parties were calling for the populace to rally behind the Republican state. The Popular Front strategy was a fake "unity" that would only subordinate the working class to capitalist legality and allow the rebuilding of the bourgeois army and police forces. A political strategy that defends capitalist authority must inevitably clash with the workers' efforts at revolutionary change.

However, in failing to take the initiative to unite the working class independently of the Republican state at the crucial moment, in July of '36, the CNT of Catalonia was in effect abandoning the only feasible alternative to the Popular Front strategy.

While the Catalan CNT was joining the Anti-Fascist Militia Committee, the national CNT was trying to gain UGT agreement for a program for replacing the Republican state with a National Defense Council of CNT and UGT union delegates. However, Marcel Rosenberg, the Soviet ambassador, warned the UGT leaders that overthrowing the Republic would deprive the anti-fascist cause of its "legitimacy."

At the end of August, 1936, Largo Caballero became head of the national government and the UGT leader asked the CNT to participate. The CNT held a national conference in early September to figure out a response. The UGT leadership had objected to the CNT's proposal for a National Defense Council on the grounds that it would exclude the Republican petty bourgeoisie (lawyers, shopkeepers, farm owners, etc.), whose aid they wanted for fighting Franco.

Thus, the CNT national conference proposed a compromise. The National Defense Council would be made up of 14 delegates -- five from the CNT, five from the UGT, and four from the Republican Party (representing the middle class).

The CNT proposed to replace the Republican army with a unified labor militia; military officers would become merely "military technicians." The CNT proposal also included socialization of the economy under union management, and a seizure of the banks. The CNT proposed to undermine Franco's position in Spanish Morocco by declaring Morocco to be independent and by giving arms to the Moroccan rebels, who had been fighting the Spanish army for decades.

However, the CNT's initiative to form a central workers power to replace the national Republican government was hindered, according to Eduardo de Guzman, a CNT journalist in Madrid, by the failure of the unions to take power in Catalonia. Said de Guzman:

"To make a revolution, power must be seized. If the CNT had done so in Catalonia, it would have helped, not hindered, our minority position in Madrid. But they believed it was sufficient to have taken the streets, to have seized arms. They completely overlooked the importance of the state apparatus which, with or without arms, retains a very great weight...The petty bourgeoisie was inevitably opposed to the proletariat. The Communists were recruiting this class, and in alliance with the petty bourgeois Republicans, were bound to gain strength if the Generalitat and the central government were reconstituted." (16)

In failing to set up a union governing power in the first couple of months after the beginning of the military revolt in July of '36, when there was no effective government at all, a revolutionary moment of great promise had been lost, de Guzman thought.

After the UGT leadership rejected the CNT's "compromise" proposal, the CNT held another national conference on September 28th, 1936. Horacio Prieto, a treintista* who was CNT National Secretary, favored CNT participation in the government. Despite the opposition of the delegation from Catalonia, the conference voted to join the government. This was done, according to the CNT National Committee, to "take an active role in the direction of the war...[and] to stop the continual sabotaging of our organization, collectives and military columns."

By September de Santillan had finally realized that his scheme for getting a share of the government's gold reserves for the CNT militias was unrealistic. He and other FAI militants then came up with a scheme to expropriate the gold. Anarchists had made contact with international arms merchants willing to sell heavy weapons. An anarchist militia column, stationed in Madrid, would seize the gold in the middle of the night and the CNT railway union agreed to have a train waiting in the Madrid freight yards.

Unfortunately, de Santillan got cold feet at the last minute and told Horatio Prieto what was going on. That torpedoed the plan. In October a deal was concluded between the Popular Front government and the Stalin regime: Russia would get the gold and Spain would get Russian weapons. But Stalin imposed a condition on this business deal: No weapons for the anarchist militia!

The Popular Front disaster

The Popular Front strategy pursued by the Socialists and Communists was based on the false assumption that the conflict was "democracy versus fascism." They hoped that the "Western democracies" would give aid to the "legitimate, elected government." But fascism was a response to the spread of revolutionary aspirations among Spanish workers and the development of a mass workers movement that fought aggressively for change. The main anti-fascist forces were revolutionary unions with the avowed intent of creating self-managed socialism. In that situation, no capitalist government, irrespective of its "democratic" pretensions, could be counted on to give real support for the struggle against Franco.

The Popular Front strategy meant that the CNT's proposal for helping the Moroccan rebels had to be shelved. As George Orwell observed:

"The palpable truth is that no attempt was made to foment a rising in Morocco...The first necessity...would have been to proclaim Morocco liberated."

But any weapons given to the Moroccan rebels would have also been used against the French colonial regime in French Morocco.

"And we can imagine how pleased the French would have been by that! The best strategic opportunity of the war was flung away in the vain hope of placating French and British capitalism."(18)

The potential for international worker solidarity was also undermined by accepting the Popular Front as the means of fighting the struggle:

"Once the war had been narrowed down to a "war for democracy" it became impossible to make any large-scale appeal for working class aid abroad...The way in which the working class in the democratic countries could really have helped her Spanish comrades was by industrial action -- strikes and boycotts. No such thing ever began to happen." (19)

The Popular Front's monopoly on arms also undermined the war effort:

"There is very little doubt that the arms were deliberately withheld lest too many of them should fall into the hands of the anarchists, who would afterwards use them for a revolutionary purpose; consequently the big Aragon offensive which would have made Franco draw back from Bilbao...never happened." (20)

The only pre-Civil War cartridge factory in Spain was located in Toledo. When Toledo was being besieged by Franco's Army of Africa, Catalonia sent a representative to ask the Popular Front government to move the plant to Catalonia. The government refused, as they feared the plant might eventually fall into the hands of the anarchists. Instead, it was captured by the fascists.

It's possible that the Spanish revolution would have been defeated by superior armed force even if the CNT had not capitulated to the Popular Front. But I think the CNT's capitulation certainly contributed to the disaster.

"Anarchist Dictatorship"?

What is the explanation for this capitulation? Price believes the explanation lies in the program and strategy of the anarchists. Says Wayne Price:

"The anarchist leaders saw only two alternatives: either the FAI...should take power where it could (in Catalonia), or it should collaborate with the capitalist parties and the capitalist state. The first choice, while "revolutionary," would betray the anarchist program by setting up a dictatorial party-state (considering that even many revolutionary workers followed other parties). The choice of collaboration also betrayed their program, but at least it seemed to keep capitalist democracy instead of fascism..."

This is an incorrect description of the anarcho-syndicalist program. To begin with, the Spanish anarchists had never advocated the taking of power by the FAI. The mass organizations of workers -- the unions, not political organizations -- were the means to working class self-emancipation, in their view. I have already argued that Price was mistaken in viewing the CNT as a mere "transmission belt" of the FAI; the CNT was in fact a mass libertarian movement in its own right.

Nor had the CNT ever considered a "strategy" of collaboration with the Popular Front prior to July of '36. In the months leading up to the July explosion, the CNT had consistently criticized the Popular Front strategy as a fake unity of leaders over the workers, a strategy that would subordinate the working class to capitalist legality. Even in July of '36, the CNT conferences in Catalonia had not seen clearly that their "temporary" participation in the Anti-Fascist Militia Committee would drag them inexorably into a practice of collaboration with the Popular Front.

Nor was it the case that the only strategy for workers power advocated by the anarchists was the CNT "taking power alone." The concept of a "revolutionary alliance" between the CNT and UGT workers had been discussed within the CNT for a number of years. The need for such an alliance was the lesson that many CNT militants drew from the failure of the CNT-initiated insurrection of January 1933. This concept of an alliance with the CNT was approved at CNT conferences in 1934 and overtures were made to the UGT at that time.

The potential for such an alliance was demonstrated during the abortive revolution in Asturias in 1934, as the CNT and UGT united into a Workers Council that briefly controlled the region before being crushed by the army. The concept of a "revolutionary alliance" with the workers of the UGT was re-affirmed again at the CNT's Saragossa Congress of May, 1936. The regional and national councils and congresses, which the CNT proposed as the organization of workers power, would not have representatives of political organizations, but would have delegates elected by the local union bodies of both the CNT and UGT. (21)

Unity in the Management of Industries

This desire for unifying the working class was demonstrated in the efforts at building new organs of workers management in such industries as maritime shipping, railways and public utilities.

For example, the Railway Federation was set up to manage the railway lines in northeastern Spain (Catalonia, Aragon, Valencia) that had been taken over by the workers in July of '36. The base of the federation was the local assemblies:

"All the workers of each locality would meet twice a week to examine all that pertained to the work to be done... The local general assembly named a committee to manage the general activity in each station and its annexes. At [these] meetings, the decisions (direccion) of this committee, whose members continued to work [at their previous jobs], would be subjected to the approval or disapproval of the workers, after giving reports and answering questions." (22)

The delegates on the committee could be removed by an assembly at any time.

The highest coordinating body of the Railway Federation was the "Revolutionary Committee," whose members were elected by union assemblies in the various divisions. Since the UGT and CNT rail unions had about equal support among the workers, each union elected an equal number of delegates. The control over the rail lines, according to Gaston Leval, "did not operate from above downwards, as in a statist and centralized system. The Revolutionary Committee had no such powers...The members of the...committee being content to supervise the general activity and to coordinate that of the different routes that made up the network."

Price criticizes "union management" of the economy on the grounds that it would "require the agreement of all the major union bureaucracies." Yet the maritime, utility and railway federations were constructed despite the opposition of the top UGT bureaucrats. The organization of these industrial federations, in which workers belonging to both the UGT and CNT unions had an equal say, are an indication of the CNT's committment to sharing power in a socialized economy with workers belonging to the other unions. They had no intention of imposing a CNT "dictatorship" over industries and communities where other unions were entrenched among the workforce.

It is true that the UGT leaders were capable of obstruction. In southern and central Spain, where the UGT was the larger union among rail workers, the railways were initially placed under the control of an "Operating Committee" made up of three delegates of the CNT rail union, three people chosen by the UGT rail union members, and three government representatives. The UGT and CNT rail workers cooperated closely and the government reps were generally ignored. However, to thwart the "union socialization" that was being built by the workers independent of -- and against -- the government, the UGT tops replaced the UGT worker delegates with people of their own choice. And they did this without consulting the UGT rank-and-file.

"Workers Councils": No Panacea

But it's hard to see how Price's slogan of "democratic councils independent of the unions"(23) would have made much difference. If the UGT rail workers could have been persuaded to join an "independent council," why couldn't they have been persuaded to extend the Railway Federation to the other areas? If the reformist Socialist Party (PSOE) leaders could use their control of the UGT apparatus to sabotage workers management, why wouldn't they have been able to also use that same influence to sabotage or control "independent councils"?

The workers councils formed in Germany in 1918, after the collapse of the Kaiser regime, are an illustration of this problem. The German Social-Democrats had dominated the German labor movement for years, and, thus, they were able to control the German workers councils. As a result, those councils capitulated to the employing class and helped to set up a new capitalist State, the Weimar Republic.

The example of the Russian "soviets" of 1917 show how "workers councils independent of the unions" can also have their problems of top-down control. ("Soviet" is Russian for "council.") One of the most important soviets in the Russian revolution was in the city of Petrograd (now called Leningrad). "This organization," writes Pete Rachleff,(24) "was formed from the top down by a group of liberal and radical intellectuals who got together on February 27 [1917] and constituted themselves as the `Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet'." The body of workers' and soldiers' delegates who met in the soviet did not really control the decision-making. The real power had been concentrated in the hands of the Executive Committee. Few decisions of the Executive Committee were submitted for ratification to the soviet assembly, which was considered a mere rubber stamp anyway.

Workers revolution as an historical process

Advocates of "independent workers councils" usually conceive of the latter as bodies that would arise in the immediate situation of social crisis and revolution. Sometimes there is a scenario of councils forming as a "spontaneous" reaction to a capitalist crisis, such as a major depression or war.(25)

But I do not believe that a libertarian revolution can be merely a spontaneous reaction to crisis. A number of revolutions in the 20th century have led to authoritarian, statist regimes, as in Cuba and China, and this should remind us that the overthrow of a discredited regime in crisis does not guarantee that the outcome will be a libertarian society, directly managed by working people. In order for a revolution to have a libertarian outcome, I believe that a mass movement based upon direct control by rank-and-file workers must have already emerged and become a key factor in the crisis.

The "materialist conception of history" provided marxists with their theory of why revolutions occur. Marx sees a revolution against capitalism occurring when the technological capacity ("productive forces") that has been rapidly built up under capitalism cannot be fully used to provide people with what they need. As in a major depression when factories and farms are idle while people are deprived of the things that could be produced. This "contradiction between the productive forces and capitalist social relations" then produces a working class rebellion, in Marx's scenario.

Often marxists (in the Bolshevik tradition) believe that the role of the "vanguard party" is necessary to direct this rebellion but capitalist failure is seen as the cause of motion towards revolution. Though the "contradiction" between the potential benefit from industry and the austerity imposed by a capitalism in crisis certainly may be an important factor in the movement of society towards revolution, libertarians have argued that a libertarian re-organization of society by the working class is not generated merely by the internal failings of the capitalist economy.

The working class must have developed its own democratic, self-managed movement to have the power to transform society in the direction of workers power. The development of a practice of democratic decision-making and mass participation is necessary if workers selfmanagement is to overcome all of the forces tending to re-impose the hierarchical practices fostered by class society.

The development of workers self-activity also shapes working class consciousness. The ideas that workers tend to act on at a given time depend upon the level of solidarity and action they see among fellow workers. When solidarity is not very widespread, as in the present-day USA, people will tend not to count on it, and will try to get the best deal they can within the system as individuals. Ideas of democratic, libertarian re-organization of society, which will seem "utopian" to most people during quieter times, will be seen as more relevant and practical in a period of major mass actions which give workers more of a sense of their power to change society.

The importance of the strategy of developing unions democratically self-managed by the rank-and-file is that it provides a means of building up a workers movement in a period when workers are only beginning to challenge the bosses for power and develops the practice of democratic decision-making and direct participation that is essential to the democratic transformation of society. A movement controlled democratically by the mass of workers is the only way of guaranteeing that workers will end up in control of society. "Workers revolution" thus refers to the historical period in which such a movement develops and begins to pose a direct challenge to boss power.

The libertarian emphasis upon the democratic organization and direct activity of workers is not incompatible with a "materialist" concept of social change. The working class is itself the main "productive force" in society since nothing could be produced without our skills, knowledge and work efforts. As workers develop their solidarity and self-managed movement, this is a "development of the productive forces" that is crucial for the creation of libertarian socialism.

Power, Yes -- State, No

The process of workers revolution in Spain in the '30s developed through a mass union movement. Given that historical context, the CNT's program of "workers councils" formed jointly by the unions would have made more sense than Price's slogan of "councils independent of the unions."

But if the CNT had replaced the government of Catalonia in July of '36 with workers councils, as the Nototros proposed, these councils would have been dominated by the CNT even if the other unions were represented. Would this have been an "anarchist dictatorship"? "Yes," say the CNT activists who supported the collaboration with the Popular Front. And Price seems to agree. But I think they were wrong.

The Nosotros were calling for the CNT to carry out its program. This would have meant replacing the Generalitat with a Defense Council in which only union assemblies (not political parties) were represented. The CNT would have had to call a Regional Congress of unions and invite the UGT and independent unions(26) to send delegates. Workers management of industry would have been consolidated through planning and unification. Though the CNT would have dominated this structure, I do not believe that this could be fairly termed an "anarchist dictatorship."

The CNT program did not call for suppressing other viewpoints. The various viewpoints that existed among the workforce would be represented in the deliberations and debates of the Regional Congress and on the coordinating Councils.(27) The various political groups would be free to organize and publish their periodicals. The CNT would be dominant because it had overwhelming support among the workers of Catalonia. Majority rule does not constitute a "dictatorship."

Replacing the government certainly would have encountered strong opposition from the small business and managerial classes -- the social classes represented by Companys' political party (Partit Esquerra Republicana Catalana -- Left Republican Catalan Party). But how could there possibly be a libertarian revolution that did not encounter opposition from bosses and politicians?

There were a number of industries in Catalonia where the CNT did "take power alone" -- such as plate glass-manufacturing, furniture-making, the movie industry, hospitals, and hair-cutting. But in these areas the CNT was the only union and had the participation of the majority of workers.

I think Price does not realize the extent to which the CNT was a mass organization. For example, 93% of the 7,000 workers on the Barcelona streetcar and subway system belonged to the CNT sindicato unico of transport workers in Barcelona. Libertarian ideas were certainly present in the life of the union, and the majority of delegates at the CNT congresses in 1931 and 1936 were anarchists, but the CNT was not an anarchist political group. Workers joined it because they saw the necessity of solidarity, and wanted to fight the employing class. Anarchism had widespread support because workers felt that it best suited their aspirations and interests.

The RSL puts heavy emphasis on "building the revolutionary party." Presumably Price and the RSL would want their "revolutionary party" to gain influence for its ideas in mass organizations, such as Price's councils. But if they were successful in gaining acceptance for their ideas, would that mean that democratic council power would be an "RSL party dictatorship"? If not, then Price is inconsistent when he says that the influence of the FAI in the CNT would make CNT union power into a "party-state dictatorship."

Price is right to insist that democratic workers organizations must allow for the plurality of viewpoints that exist within the working class. In Spain in the '30s this pluralism was expressed in the division into different unions as well as in the different viewpoints within the unions. Since the anarcho-syndicalist program called for rank-and-file assemblies to elect and instruct delegates, and participation of all the unions in the councils and congresses, it's hard to see how this pluralism is not respected.

Marxists have often argued that it would be necessary to build a "workers state" in a revolution in order to organize effective armed force against the defenders of capitalist power. As Price says, "coercion -- repression -- power -- authority" would be needed. But libertarians reply, Why can't the workers build and coordinate a militia of their own and control the defense of their revolution directly and democratically, through their own organizations (unions, councils of delegates elected from the shopfloor)? This is what the CNT's program called for.

Exercizing authority over a territory, having the dominance in armed force -- these are the usual criteria of a "state" in bourgeois liberal political theory. But on that definition, a society without a state would be impossible. The liberal definition of the State is inadequate because it ignores the division of society into classes with conflicting interests. Keeping the bosses in power is an essential function of the State.

Anarchists have sometimes pointed out that a number of the functions performed by the State are useful to society (street lighting, sewage disposal, investigating murders, etc.) and would still exist in a libertarian society, though organized quite differently. This would not make a libertarian social order "a type of state."

What is essential to a state is that its authority and armed power be top-down, insulated from direct control by the workforce. Otherwise it could not function to protect the power of a boss class. When the workforce in society directly and democratically controls the dominant armed force and the management of the economy, this is not a "state" in the historical sense.

Marxists have usually argued that workers power built in a revolution must be consolidated in a "state" since the workers' armed fight against the defenders of capitalism means "repression" of "another class." As Engels said:

"A revolution is the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets, and cannon -- authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries." (28)

But Engels is here playing with words. When the power of the bosses is broken, and workers take over control of the society, this is an act of liberation. To say that the armed defense of the workers freedom is "authoritarian" is like saying that I am engaging in "theft" if I take back from a thief the jacket that he previously stole from me.

The "repression" directed against the capitalist class consists in forcibly removing their power to exploit the working class. But the former bosses do not thus become a new exploited class; they simply lose their former position as order-givers and owners. As the economy is re-organized under workers management, ex-bosses are forced to accept equality, to become workers like everybody else.

But they would enjoy the same rights as everyone else -- including the right to criticize existing arrangements. Of course, if they go beyond mere grousing and actually make an armed attempt to re-impose their rule, the community has the right to use armed force to defend its freedom. But the community's collective, democratic control of the dominant armed force is not a "state" because there is no longer a separate, privileged class in possession of political and economic power.

Origin of the "Collectives"

Though the regional union conferences in Catalonia had put off overthrowing the government in July of '36, workers began taking over the management of industries as soon as the street-fighting had died down. The initiative for this did not come from the higher bodies -- the regional and national committees -- but from the rank-and-file activists in the local unions. In some cases this happened because the top management of the enterprise had fled, and it was necessary for the workers to take over if production was to continue. But in many cases the local union militants decided to take advantage of the situation to push a revolutionary solution.

But the seizure of these workplaces very quickly led to a problem of coordination.

The CNT had never proposed that factories or other facilities would be owned by the people who happened to work there. The CNT's program called for the construction of "libertarian communism." This would mean that the economy as a whole would be socialized, it would not consist of producers operating independently of each other on the basis of market exchange. Instead, workers would manage the industry they work in as a kind of "subcontract" from the whole community.

Since the society's entire workforce would "own" the means of production, all would have a right to share in the output. This would mean that the economy would no longer be regulated by the market, but by social needs, articulated in the regional and national workers Congresses and coordinated through the Economics Councils. Thus, workers would have free access to the output of other workplaces, relations between people in society would no longer be regulated on the basis of buying and selling. If buying and selling is no longer the principle of distribution, then money becomes unnecessary. However, some Spanish libertarians argued that there would be an initial transitional stage in which wages would be equalized as a prelude to doing away with wages altogether.

Andreu Capdevila, an CNT textile union activist, describes these ideas:

"We libertarians have a maxim which is binding: Each shall produce according to his abilities, each shall consume according to his needs. Production is like a clock -- each part is interdependent, if one part fails the clock will no longer show the hour. It's very difficult to determine which of the workers fulfilling so many different tasks is the most important. The miner digging out the coal, the worker transporting it to the factory, the stoker shoveling it into the factory furnace? Without any of them, the process would stop. All should be paid the same..." (29)

However, in order to do away with market exchange, it was necessary to establish a federative unity of the entire workforce, and a means of making collective decisions for the entire economy. This required the setting up of the workers congresses and economic coordinating councils, to replace the government and establish a unified control of the society.

Since the consolidation of the revolution had been put off "until after Franco is beaten," the unions that had seized workplaces were confronted with a dilemma. They had control of their individual workplaces, but the original libertarian plan for economic coordination was precluded by the continued existence of the State.

This dilemma was debated at a CNT union plenary in September of 1936. The idea of converting the worker-managed workplaces into cooperatives, operating in a market economy, had never been advocated by the Spanish anarchists before the Civil War, but was now seen by some as a temporary stop-gap that would solve the immediate question of what to do with the workplaces that had been seized by the workers. It was at this meeting that the term "collective" was first adopted to describe this solution. This concept of "collectivization" was suggested by Joan Fabregas, a Catalan nationalist of middle class origin who had joined the CNT after July of '36.

"Up to that moment, I had never heard of collectivization as a solution for industry(30) -- the department stores were being run by the union," says Joan Ferrer, the Commercial Union secretary. "What the new system meant was that each collectivized firm would retain its individual character, but with the ultimate objective of federating all enterprises within the same industry..."(30)

However, a number of unions went beyond "collectivization" and took over all the facilities in their industries, eliminating competition between separate firms. The many small barber and beauty shops in Barcelona were shut down and replaced with large neighborhood haircutting centers, run through the assemblies of the CNT barbers' union. The CNT bakers union did something similar. The CNT Wood Industry Union shut down the many mom-and-pop cabinet-making shops, where conditions were often dangerous and unhealthy. They were replaced with two large factories, which included new facilities for the benefit of the workforce, such as a large swimming pool.

The union ran the entire industry, from the felling of timber in the Val d'Aran to the furniture showrooms in Barcelona. The railway, maritime shipping and water, gas and electric industry unions also pursued this strategy of industrial unification, as did the textile union in the industrial town of Badalona, outside Barcelona. This was considered to be a step in the direction of eventual socialization.

At the Catalan union plenary of September, 1936, "the bigger, more powerful unions, like the woodworkers, the transport workers, the public entertainment union, all of which had already socialized [i.e. unified their industries under union management], wanted to extend their solution to the rest of industry. The smaller, weaker unions wanted to form cooperatives..."(31)

The Communists and the petty bourgeois Republican leaders in Catalonia were opposed to any moves in the direction of carrying out the CNT's original socialization program. This was expressed in the conflict over the content and implementation of the decree "legalizing" the worker-takeovers, which was eventually passed in October of '36. The Communists and Republicans wanted to minimize the scope of these takeovers and especially opposed moves in the direction of economic unification and overall economic regulation from below through "union management."

The collectivization decree was a compromise that called for conversion of all workplaces with more than 100 workers into "collectives," that is, worker-managed businesses operating in a market economy. Half of the profits of the collectives would go into an industrial and commercial credit fund to finance all of Catalonia's industry; 20% was to go into a reserve and depreciation fund; 15% for the collective's social needs; and 15% into a discretionary fund that could be used in any way the general assembly of workers decided. This set-up is generally considered to be the historical precedent for the system of "market socialism" enacted in Yugoslavia in the '50s.

This system of market self-management had both problems and triumphs. The collectives did tend to prevent layoffs, even when Civil War and international boycott led to a severe drop in the market for their product. The workers simply shared the available work and continued to pay wages to the whole workforce of the collective. Moreover, the collectives represented an attempt by the working class to hold onto control of production; and it clearly demonstrated that workers can manage industry.

However, some collectives had inherited better equipment or resources than others. The separation into autonomous units led to competition as each collective attempted to market its own product. "The collectivism we are living in Spain is not anarchist collectivism," complained Horacio Prieto in 1938, "it is the creation of a new capitalism ...Rich collectives refuse to recognize any responsibilities, duties or solidarity towards poor collectives..."(32)

Josep Costa, secretary of the CNT textile union in Badalona, was critical of the collectivization of the textile industry in nearby Barcelona:

"We didn't see the Barcelona textile collectives as models for our experience. Individual collectivized mills acted there from the beginning as though they were completely autonomous units, marketing their own products as they could and paying little heed to the general situation. It caused a horrific problem. It was a sort of popular capitalism..."

Smaller, weaker collectives were in a position where they had trouble paying their workers while larger plants with more modern equipment were in no such danger. Finally, in February, 1937, a joint UGT/CNT textile union congress was held in Catalonia to establish a Textile Industry Council that could coordinate the industry and end competition between workplaces. The congress agreed that collectivization of individual plants had been mistaken and that it was necessary to proceed rapidly towards complete socialization of the industry.

The formation of the worker-managed enterprises in the Spanish Civil War has sometimes led people (including some anarchists) to misconceptions about the anarcho-syndicalist program. This passage is typical:

"At the time of the Civil War, a popular idea among the Spanish working class and peasants was that each factory, area of land, etc., should be owned collectively by its workers, and that these "collectives" should be linked with each other ...without any superior central authority. This basic idea had been propagated by anarchists in Spain for more than 50 years." (34)

However, the "collectives" instituted during the Civil War were seen by the CNT as merely a temporary stop-gap. They had not been advocated in the CNT's pre-Civil War program, but came into existence precisely because the CNT was unable to carry out its libertarian communist program, which would have required setting up workers congresses and coordinating councils to establish coordination and planning for the economy as a whole.

Go to part II